This paper assesses the magnitude and effects of tax incentives towards research and development (R&D) around the globe. It establishes the biggest existing data-set on such incentives, covering 106 countries annually between 1996 and 2012. We formulate two combined measures of tax incentives: one is a measure of effective marginal tax reductions on R&D incentives, referred to as the b-index in the literature, of which existing data-sets cover up to 38 countries; a second, novel one is the effective average tax rate on profits from R&D investments (EAT R R&D ), which is not available from other databases. Marginal tax incentives are only relevant for R&D investments at the intensive project margin, but they are nonetheless commonly used to analyze extensive project margin outcomes such as patent filing and trading or even research lab location due to lacking data on effective average tax rates. The paper assesses effects of these incentives on the filing and trading of patents (conditional on other drivers of patenting) based on some 2 million patent incidents from the European Patent Office. The results suggest that a higher level of effective average front-end R&D tax incentives raise the propensity to file and acquire patents, and they reduce the incentive to sell patents. Moreover, more extensive effective average back-end R&D tax incentives raise the propensity to acquire patents. The partial effects of statutory tax rates and the net-present value of depreciation allowances underlying effective average tax rates are larger in absolute value than those underlying effective marginal tax rates (the b-index) for both patent filing and trading. Hence, inappropriately using the b-index for extensive research-investment or patenting margins may lead to a downward-biased incidence of important tax instruments for research activities at the extensive margin.
Introduction
Technical change, and R&D as one of its determinants, are among the key drivers of economic growth at microeconomic (Griliches 1981; Acemoglu and Linn, 2004) and macroeconomic levels (Romer 1990; Howitt 2000 Howitt , 2004 . For the promotion of R&D and the emergence of innovation and ideas, economic policy has a number of instruments at hand. The most important ones are front-end measures such as tax credits on R&D investments, a super deduction of R&D expenses (i.e., a deductibility of more than 100% from the tax base), tax holidays for firms with big R&D investments for a number of years, and grants for certain R&D investments, and back-end measures such as the (at least partial) exemption of returns on R&D investments (e.g., royalties) through so-called patent boxes. From the viewpoint of economic policy, documenting and measuring these incentives is key for a quantification of their impact on outcome such as the filing and ownership of patents and their subsequent impact on economic prosperity. Beyond the filing of patents, their ownership deserves special attention to understand possible discrepancies between the location of innovation activity and the associated benefits of ownership.
The OECD (2000) has made an attempt to unify these measures -except for grants, tax holidays, and patent boxes -under a single, composite index, which is now known as the b-index (see Warda, 2002) . The OECD covers R&D tax incentives for 24 countries in 1999 and up to 38 countries in 2009, and it provides a combined measure of these countries' tax incentives through the b-index, which corresponds to the effective marginal tax rate on R&D, EM T R R&D (see Warda 2002) , reflecting a representative company's pre-tax profit which is necessary to break even on a marginal (unitary) R&D investment. The limited coverage of countries in the OECD's database may induce a bias due to measurement error in some earlier empirical studies, because it does not cover all countries with positive R&D incentives, and the b-index is often used to study discrete R&D-investment decisions.
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The b-index has been frequently used in the recent literature on R&D tax incentives. A recent survey by the European Commission (2014) suggests that the literature on R&D tax incentives has so far largely focused on determining the effects of tax incentives on R&D inputs. The present paper is one of the few that considers effects of tax incentives on R&D output. 5 Other papers along this line are the following. In their simulation-based paper, Elschner and Ernst (2008) use it to simulate its (negative) effect on aggregate corporate tax payments across 27 European Union member countries. Westmore (2013) uses it to capture the short-run effect of a change in the user-cost of R&D and finds that a decline in the b-index leads to a short-run increase in patent filing across countries and to a long-run increase in the national stock of R&D. Using firm-level data, Ernst et al. (2014) evaluate the effect of the b-index on the quality of patents held by firms. They find lower tax rates on R&D investments to have a positive effect on attracted R&D projects, whereas tax credits and allowances summarized by the b-index have a statistically significant and negative impact on the quality of research projects. Baumann et al. (2014) also use firm-level data and employ home-and host-country b-index data within a firm's network of subsidiaries. They find that higher b-index values in the home and/or the host country raise the quality-adjusted patent filing in a given location. They conclude that inefficiently high tax incentives for R&D constitute a beggar-thy-neighbor policy, where firms relocate to benefit from foreign incentive schemes for R&D. Especially the last two papers use the b-index -a marginal-type tax concept -in the context of discrete investment options and choices (to use a certain technology or not, to locate in a certain country or not, to maintain ownership of a patent or not, etc.).
Clearly, as effective marginal tax rates (EM T Rs) for physical-capital investment projects should not be used to analyze discrete or lumpy investment decisions (see empirical work on the location of foreign affiliates of multinational firms or of patents. 5 We should note that the measurement neither of R&D expenditures as an innovation input nor that of patenting as an innovation output is perfect, though measures thereof are positively correlated. We refer to interested reader to Bound et al. (1984) for an in-depth discussion of associated measurement issues. Griffith 1998, 2003) , the b-index should not be used for studying discrete R&D investment decisions and the associated output. To which extent the location of R&D units, patent filings, or the trading of patents are marginal or discrete may not be entirely clear, but we would argue that these outcomes should not be considered as to be purely marginal. What is needed then is an effective average tax rate on R&D (EAT R R&D ). However, information on the latter is to date not available.
This paper aims at filling this gap, providing information on 106 economies and their R&D tax incentives between 1996 and 2012. We collect individual measures of tax incentives and combine them in the form of the b-index as well as an EAT R R&D which is constructed akin to the widely-used EAT R proposed by Griffith (1998, 2003) . The paper then sheds light on the relevance of the matter of proper measurement of R&D tax incentives by studying their effects on the filing and trading of some 2 million patents notified to the European Patent Office between 1996 and 2012.
The main insights from the analysis for patent filing and patent trading as two extensive patent margins are the following. First, a higher b-index (EM T R R&D ) and a higher EAT R R&D are found to reduce patent filing in a country across most technology fields and they are found to raise patent exports by the country of origin and reduce patent imports by the country of destination. Second, the quantitative partial effects of the individual tax instruments underlying the b-index and the EAT R R&D are substantially different. Specifically, relative to the EAT R R&D , using the b-index leads to a severe downward bias of the quantitative effects of tax instruments such as statutory tax rates and net-present value of depreciation allowances for aggregate (country-level) patent filing and even more so for aggregate (countrypair-level) bilateral patent imports or acquisitions. Hence, considering the right instrument for an analysis of tax incidence at extensive patenting margins appears quantitatively very important.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section pro-vides an overview of the literatures on R&D tax incentives, patent filings, and patent trading. Section 3 discusses the two combined measures of R&D tax incentivesthe b-index as an EM T R R&D and the EAT R R&D . Sections 4 and 5 summarize data and the empirical analysis regarding R&D tax incentives and patent filing and trading. The last section offers a set of conclusions.
2 Literature review on effects of R&D tax incentives and other determinants of patenting
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of relevant research on the drivers of R&D-investment projects in general and of patent filing and trading in particular with particular emphasis on tax instruments. Overall, this overview will guide the empirical analysis which will focus on the role of combined R&D tax and non-tax incentives, using aggregate as well as technology-field-level data from the European Patent Office in Section 5.
Effects of R&D tax incentives
Earlier work acknowledges the potential role of R&D tax incentives mainly for patent filing. Warda (2002) was one of the first to utilize the b-index, a compact measure of corporate taxation, tax credit, R&D expenditures, and depreciation rates for explaining R&D -i.e., the input into innovation. Westmore (2013) employs the b-index to explain both R&D (innovation input) as well as patenting (innovation output) by the b-index conditional on other determinants. Baumann et al. (2014) model patent counts across the subsidiaries in multinational firms as a function of the b-index. Ernst et al. (2014) even propose to model the location of high-quality and high-return innovations (measured by patent citations) as a function of R&D tax incentives.
The findings in Warda (2002) and Westmore (2013) suggest that lowering the b-index (introducing a more generous incentive system) raises both R&D as well as the number of patents per capita. 6 Moreover, the results in Baumann et al. (2014) indicate that differences in R&D tax incentives across the locations of subsidiaries within a multinational firm network distort the discrete location of patents, and the findings of Ernst et al. (2014) point towards a particularly high relevance of the latter for high-quality patents (i.e., ones with many citations).
Clearly neither the filing nor the ownership or trading of patents should be viewed as purely marginal R&D investment decisions, as patent filings are at least in part the outcome of discretely-large projects and patent ownership location or patent trading is a discrete rather than a marginal choice by definition. Hence, the question is how the quantitative insights gained from using the b-index as an EM T R R&D for patent filing and trading or ownership compare with ones based on the EAT R R&D .
Some general background information about the pros and cons of patenting
While filing a patent provides protection to a firm's investment in successful R&D and exclusivity of using the patent for up to 20 years, going through the application process eventually entails a nontrivial cost. However, there is already a significant level of intellectual property-rights protection even prior to the granting of a patent through the so-called First-to-File Principle. The latter establishes that whoever files first for a patent (eventually, independently of being the originator of the innovation) has the right for getting the associated patent granted if the application meets the required standards. 7 During the period between the start of the patent process (the filing) and its completion (the granting), this protection is upheld which limits 6 Galasso et al. (2013) show for the United States and the period 1983-2000 that also capital gains taxes strongly affect the decision to trade patent rights for individual inventors.
7 Only roughly 50% of all patent applications are granted.
the incentives of a timely pursuit of patent processes, especially, ones that pertain to innovations whose economic value is unclear or expected to be of lesser importance.
In 2012 it cost on average about 5,300 Euros to take a European patent application to the grant phase. 8 After that phase, ratification of the patent grant has still to be sought from each country (e.g., each European Union member country) where the applicant seeks protection (which requires the translation of the patent text to the official national tongues of the countries where protection is sought). After the first phase of patent protection expires, patents may be renewed, which comes at the cost of renewal fees. In any case, the total costs of exercising the merits of a patent from application to ratification are staggered, and after each phase of the application procedure the applicant can decide to quit the process. Stevnsborg and van
Pottelsberghe de la suggest that delaying the process after having filed an application has three advantages: an immediate cost advantage (delaying large expenses, especially, if a large geographical coverage of protection is sought); gaining time to assess the value of the patent; and creating uncertainty in the market (signalling technological leadership). Specifically, it is well-known that firms do not patent each and every technology invented but that there are incentives for secrecy.
The filing-secrecy-decision may also be affected by taxes; it might, e.g., be easier to shift technology income from high-tax to low-tax countries if the technology is patented (creating some visible substance and more easily justifying royalty flows within the firm when the income distribution is assessed by tax authorities).
Determinants of patent stocks and flows

Fundamental drivers of patent filing and trading
In line with economic theory, the literature on patenting suggests that more patents are filed by inventors from and in more attractive (larger, richer, skill-abundant, high-R&D-expenditure, more open) markets (Falk 2004) . It is now widely held that tax policy instruments affect the filing and owner location of patents (see Ernst et al., 2014; Westmore 2013; Baumann et al., 2014) , including patent trading (see Galasso et al., 2013) . While tax incentives appear important, so do other institutional factors (administrative costs, regulatory standards, and financial-sector development; see Egger and Keuschnigg, 2014) .
Apart from the determinants of patent filing and granting, there is an interest in patent trading (or change of ownership) between patent owners (e.g., innovatorowners and purchaser-owners as well as other pairs of "old" and "new" owners of patents). Galasso et al. (2013) list three main reasons for patent trading: vertical specialisation; comparative advantage in patent enforcement -some firms are more productive in their use than others (including defensive patent portfolio and lower litigation risk after acquisition); and patent trolling (using the patent portfolio for litigation). These reasons suggest a role for capital taxation and, indeed, Galasso et al. (2013) find that capital gains taxes negatively affect patent trading. They show that product-market gains are an important driver of patent trading.
A key determinant of patent trading is patent quality as reflected in prior trading of a patent and citations received (see Serrano, 2010 , for evidence on a sample of patents of the United States over the years [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . The likelihood of patent trading declines with patent age and generality (e.g., measured by the dispersion of citations across technology fields), and it declines with the importance of the innovator, being ceteris paribus largest for individual private innovators and smallest for large companies. Furthermore, patent-trading rates (or transfer rates) are technology-field-specific and tend to be largest for pharmaceutical patents. Smaller, less important innovators and patent holders do not only have a higher propensity to sell patents, they also have a higher propensity to buy them (see Figueroa and Serrano, 2013) . However, larger buyers have a higher propensity to acquire more valuable patents (in terms of citations and their complementarity to the existing portfolio) and build up higher-quality and better-matching patent portfolios, the latter being important for the value of patents (see Fischer and Henkel, 2012; Figueroa and Serrano, 2013) . 9 It is even the case that acquired patents on average raise the value of other patents in a portfolio by more than non-acquired patents (see Duflos and Pfister, 2008 , for evidence in the pharmaceutical industry). , and one minus the corporate tax rate, 1 − τ it :
The lower the b−index it , the lower are the after-tax costs for a firm from marginally
includes incentives such as any R&D tax credits (credit it ), deductions (deduc it ), super deductions (superd it ), and, if applicable, the net present value of special depreciation allowances for buildings (d 9 The probability for a patent to be acquired by a small firm increases with the match between the patent and the technology profile of existing small buyers relative to the one of large buyers.
10 Beyond mere economic reasons, patents are acquired for legal reasons since large patent portfolios shield firms from lengthy infringement procedures and increase bargaining power in licensing and cross-licensing deals (see Resis 2006; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007; Goldberg 2013) . Altogether, the reallocation of patent rights through trading or takeover appears to reduce litigation risk (see Galasso et al., 2013) . On average, firms which acquire patents have a smaller return on investment than firms which file patents (see Bloningen and Taylor, 2000; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006) . in the context of R&D.
11 Because current and capital R&D expenditures are depreciated differently across countries, we use the two alternative weights of 90%
(current expenditure) and 10% (capital expenditure), respectively, for these expenditures (see Warda, 2002) . The capital expenditures are split evenly between d b it and d m it as is customary in effective tax-rate formulas (see Egger et al., 2009) .
12 Formally,
can be written as:
where D it is a binary indicator variable stating whether tax credit is taxable (D it = 1) such as in the United States or not (D it = 0). The value 0.9 in equation (2) corresponds to the value used by Warda (2002) for current expenditure, and the value of 0.05 corresponds to the product of 0.1 (for a 10% depreciation of capital expenditure) tomes 0.5 times the sum of depreciation rates for buildings and machinery (as in Warda, 2002) . In general, the weighting of different expenditures is used to obtain a common depreciation rate (see Warda, 2002) .
Clearly, differentiating the b-index with respect to a generic component v it ∈ {τ it , deduc it , d it , credit it }, we obtain
11 If no super deductions exist, superd it is usually unity, as current expenditures can be depreciated in most cases immediately. An exception is Russia, where until 2007 expenses for successful R&D projects could only be deducted over two years, while from 2007 onwards deduction was and is allowed in full and independent of success. If no special depreciation regimes prevail in a country, the normal statutory depreciation rates for buildings and machinery are used to calculate the net-present value of depreciation allowances according to the depreciation rules (straight-line, declining-balance, or combinations thereof) as stated in the national tax code.
12 We assume current expenditures to be depreciable immediately for countries where we cannot obtain such information from the national taxcode. For few countries we extrapolate unavailable data for depreciation allowances on capital assets in time. As depreciation rules vary only little if at all over the years, this approach seems justifiable. For very few cases we had no information on depreciation allowances of an asset class (buildings, machinery and intangibles). In these cases, we used average depreciation rates available in the literature. Using this permits calculating the b-index and EAT R R&D for 106 countries instead of 58.
where, the last term is zero whenever v it = τ it , and it is −
In general, the b-index as an EM T R R&D and the EAT R R&D are proportional to the financing rate and the economic depreciation rate. We ignore this fact here as is often done in calculations of forward-looking effective tax rates. A rationale for this is that one may want to keep this variation constant for a model firm. One might also view financing and economic depreciation rates to be relatively similar for large, innovative firms across countries.
Effective average tax rates for R&D investments (EAT R R&D )
Conceptually, the b-index is related to the concept of the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR, see Warda 2002) . The EMTR is defined as the difference between the cost of capital, A
EAT R R&D it
, and the after-tax rate of return of an alternative investment over A EAT R R&D it
. As outlined in Griffith (1998, 2003) , it is the effective average tax rate (EATR) which is important when considering location decisions of firms and other extensive investment margins or choices. An EATR measures the discrete cost of capital associated with investing in a specific jurisdiction relative to not doing so. We exploit this feature of the EATR in the context of R&D tax incentives and develop a measure for the cost of capital, A
, similar to the one used in the b-index to calculate country-specific levels of the EAT R R&D in the spirit of EAT Rs for physical-capital investments as developed by Griffith (1998, 2003) .
For establishing the EAT R R&D , we largely build upon the framework developed by Devereux and Griffith (2003) as used in Egger et al. (2009) for physical-capital investments. EAT R R&D is defined as the difference between the pre-tax and after-tax net-present values of a hypothetical investment in one period, R * and R, respectively, over, p/(1 + r),
where p represents the pre-tax rate of return on capital and r is the nominal interest rate. Hence, as in Devereux and Griffith (2003) , R * is invariant across countries and time and defined as
To calculate the country-time-varying R it , we consider three different financing options -retained earnings R 
For an investment financed through retained earnings, the after-tax net-present value of investment to the shareholder is equal to
where
) is invariant and assumed to be unity (consistent with a comprehensive tax system; see Egger et al., 2009) . 13 Furthermore, ρ is the invariant nominal discount rate applied by shareholders, π is the inflation rate, and
is the economic rate of depreciation (without taxation) where we use equal weights for each depreciation argument: depreciation for buildings (δ b ), for machinery (δ m ), for inventories (δ inv ), and for intangibles (δ int ). Notice that an increase in δ reduces the net dividend amount of the first term in equation (7) and it raises the net costs of investment represented by the second term in that equation.
includes the net-present value of country-specific depreciation allowances as well as deduction allowances and super deductions for R&D investment, and credit it contains the ordinary tax credits as well as special R&D tax credits. Dif-
13
The terms m d and m g denote the personal income tax rates on dividends and capital gains and c is the rate of tax credit. Under a classical income tax system, c = 0. Assuming a comprehensive income tax, m d = m g , whereby γ = 1.
ferent types of assets are treated differently by tax law, so that A EAT R R&D it depends on the actual cum-tax (rather than the hypothetical, without-tax) composition of assets. For example, depreciation rates for buildings are lower than for machinery and investment goods and, when being used for R&D purposes, they enjoy preferable rates in some countries. To calculate the net investment costs in country i and
) from equation (7), we use country-time-specific depreciation allowances plus deduction and super-deduction allowances for R&D expenditures, all taken from national tax codes, with
it } are the cum-taxation, country-time-specific counterparts to the without-taxation country-time-invariant ones used in
We decided to include tax holidays and grants separately -as crudely-measured binary indicator variables -in the regression rather than including them in the formulae of the EM T R R&D (b-index) and the EAT R R&D . The reason is that detailed knowledge about the design and of the present discounted value of these measures is necessary to accommodate them. At this point, this was not possible in sufficient detail for the large number of countries and years covered.
If the investment is financed by issuing new shares, we follow Egger et al. (2009) and define
with (1 − τ itδit ) representing the cost of raising one unit of new equity andδ it reflecting the tax depreciation in the initial period. Therefore the after-tax netpresent value of investment under new equity finance is R
Finally, when financing the investment by using debt, the net-present value to the shareholder is R
Following Griffith (1998, 2003) , we use the following parametriza- , extra-investment allowances, ordinary tax credits, R&D tax credits, special R&D deductions and R&D superdeductions as well as the valuation of inventory) are taken from a host of sources described in the Appendix. As we abstract from shareholder taxation, ρ=0.07625, which is the nominal interest rate as in Egger et al. (2009) . Third, for federal countries we take into account local profit tax rates.
14 If alternative depreciation schemes are allowed, we use the most generous one to calculate the net-present value of depreciation allowances. If no special R&D depreciation allowances are available, we use the statutory rates. If the tax code allows for an optimal choice over the inventory valuation methods, we apply the most favorable one (i.e., last-in-first-out, LIFO, is chosen against the average-cost method, which in turn is preferred over, first-in-first-out, FIFO).
15
14 E.g., for Canada and Germany we took average tax rates as calculated by the OECD. For Switzerland we took the tax rate of the canton of Zurich.
15 Under the LIFO, assets purchased most recently at higher prices are matched against taxable revenues. Hence only the LIFO avoids taxation of variations in the stock value due to inflation, and R RE is equal to (7). In case of FIFO, any increase in value due to inflation is subject to taxation. Therefore, R RE is adjusted to
If the tax code only allows the average cost method, we multiply the second term of R RE inv,it by 0.5.
Applying this parametrization, we are able to calculate country-specific effective tax rates in the spirit of Griffith (1998, 2003) but specifically for R&D investments. As with investments in physical capital, EAT R
R&D it
depends on the financing option. We use the same weights as with physical-capital investments:
55% for retained earnings; 10% for new equity; and 35% for debt (see OECD 1991). 
Other, non-tax policy measures of R&D incentives
Data
In this section, we introduce the dependent and independent variables included in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Tax and non-tax R&D-investment-policy data
The data underlying the b-index and the EAT R R&D (including corporate tax rates, depreciation allowances) and of other tax incentives (grants, tax holidays, and patent boxes) come from the following sources: Deloitte, Ernst & Young, the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, KPMG, PriceWaterhouse Coopers, Scitax Advisory Partners LP, the OECD, and various national sources.
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Overall, we obtain annual data on 106 countries, not all of which use specific R&D incentives, covering the period 1996-2010. Inventives, 2011 , OECD (2000 , 2004 , 2006 , 2010 , OECD (1999 OECD ( , 2001 OECD ( , 2003 OECD ( , 2005 OECD ( , 2007 OECD ( , 2009 and Various national Sources. Patent quality indicators f wd cits5 it , f wd cits5 xy it , patent scope it , f amily size it and bwd cits it were obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Squicciarini et al. (2013) . The macroeconomic control variables researcher it , loggdp it , loggdppc it , loggdp jt , loggdppc jt are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2013. Cultural and geographic control variables logdist ij , border ij , language ij , colony ij , same col ij , current col ij , and post1945 col ij were taken from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) database of Mayer and Zignago (2011) .
17 The choice of the time period is mainly dictated by the limited availability of historical data on R&D incentives. While historical statutory corporate tax rates are relatively easy to obtain, especially, historical tax incentives and depreciation allowances are hard to gather. Therefore, we choose the year 1996 as the first period of the data collection. Since we employ a 5-year forwardcitations indicator, see Squicciarini et al. (2013) , as an explanatory variable in the econometric analysis, we may only use patents filed and patents traded up until 2010. Hence, the R&D incentives covered for the two most recent years (2011 and 2012) are not used in the econometric work in this paper, but are part of the descriptive sections.
Patent raw data
We obtain information on the filing and ownership of patents from the European Patent Register for PATSTAT (the Register).
18 The Register data cover all procedural events from the filing of a patent application until 9 months after a patent was granted. 19 The database is mainly intended to provide information to patent attorneys, to companies, and to research institutes to carry out patent analyses. We use it to extract information on the overall and technology-field-specific number of patent filings per country and year and of the extent of patent trade (or frequency of ownership change) by country-pair and year.
As the variable identifying a change of ownership in the Register data has to be treated with caution (see EPO, 2014) , due to the renaming and relocation of existing companies, we perform an additional semantic analysis to identify actual changes of ownership. From the raw data in the Register database we obtain five variables with company-specific information: the name of the company that applied for a patent; the street name and house number of the applicant; the postal code and city name of the applicant; the country of residence of the applicant; and the date of the transfer of ownership. We define a change of ownership to take place, when the name as well as the address (street and city) of a company holding a patent changed, to prevent confusion with mere renaming of companies and simple changes of their location. For this purpose we developed an algorithm similar to the one of Galasso et al. (2013) as applied to patent data of the United States, which disregards ownership changes where only either the name or the address of a prior patent owner changes. The time frame for a change of ownership to be observed in our data is set from the moment the patent was filed until 9 months after the patent 18 PATSTAT (European Patent Office, EPO, Worldwide Patent Statistical Database) is a snapshot of the EPO master documentation database (DOCDB) with worldwide coverage, containing 20 tables including bibliographical data, citations, and patent-family links. It is published twice a year by EPO. We work with the universe of data over the covered time span.
19 There is a 9-months opposition period after a patent has been granted by EPO. On average, it takes about 5 years from the filing of a patent to the moment the patent is being granted. Including the opposition period we observe patents on average for 5 to 6 years.
was granted, which covers on average a 5 to 6 year period for the average patent in our data.
The obtained individual patent data account for some 2 million data points (filed and either traded or not traded) over the period from 1996-2012. Ultimately, we count all patent incidents (together or per each one of 35 technology fields) as filings per country or as trading per country-pair. These counts are then used as dependent variables in the subsequent empirical panel analysis.
Patent valuation data
It is customary in the literature to use proxy variables for patent value (see Hall and Harhoff, 2012 , for a survey). Among the most successful proxies, patent citations should be mentioned (see Hall et al., 2005; Harhoff et al., 2003) . Using data from the EPO, Squicciarini et al. (2013) provide a set of 13 patent-quality indicators of which we use the following four in our analysis: forward citations, backward citations, patent family size, and patent scope.
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For forward citations, we use the citations a patent receives over the course of five after the publication date. For country-time (or country-time-technology-field) averages of these variables, we use the acronyms f wd cits5 it and f wd cits5 xy it , respectively. The two citation measures are defined as the number of citations an average patent applied for by country i in year t received within five and seven years, respectively, from the application date. In our analysis, we use two versions of these forward-citation indicators each: one takes into account all citations received, while the other one only considers X-, I-, and Y-citations. X-and I-citations refer 20 Using survey data on patent value at the firm level, Harhoff et al. (2003) find support for a role of the following indicators: forward and backward citations, patent-family size, patent scope, and opposition during the patent process. Hall et al. (2005) show that patent citations are a good measure of firm's intangible stock of knowledge. Trajtenberg (1990) develops a measure of social return to innovation which is positively correlated with citations received. Abrams et al. (2013) find an inverse-u-shaped relationship between patent value and citations received for patents held by non-practicing entities in the United States over the period 2008-2012. to documents that are particularly important when taken alone, while Y-citations refer to documents that are particularly relevant if considered in combination with documents of the same category. According to Squicciarini et al. (2013) Backward citations contain patents and scientific work as stated by the applicant in the patent application. We consider the total number of backward-citations to other patents within the average patent applications in country i at year t. For country-time (or country-time-technology-field) averages of these variables, we use the acronym bwd cits it . According to Harhoff et al. (2003) , backward citations are positively related to patent value (and higher backward-citation levels might partly reflect a broader technological scope).
A patent's family size reflects the number of patent offices at which it is protected.
In the regressions, we refer to this variable by f amily size it for the average applied patent in country i at time t. Naturally, EPO patents mostly represent several national patents and need to be validated by the different national offices to be protected in the European Patent Convention (EPC) countries. As shown by Harhoff et al. (2003) , large patent families are particularly valuable.
The patent scope is defined as the technological breadth of a patent, and we refer to the scope of the average patent in country i at time t by patent scope it . For a sample of biotechnology firms in the United States, Lerner (1994) 
Other determinants of patent filing and trading
We define two further determinants of patent trading by country i in year t based on EPO data: one is a binary indicator variable which is unity if two companies which trade patents in year t are both located in the same country i and zero otherwise; a second, count variable measures the number of patents traded by the average company in country i up to year t − 1. We refer to the first variable by same country ij and to the second one by owner it−1 .
We add country-level control variables from the World Development Indicators (WDI) version 2013. These are the number of researchers in R&D per million inhabitants in a country and year, denoted by researcher it , to control for the level of human capital in a country. Moreover, we employ the log of the gross domestic product (GDP), log(gdp it ) and log(gdp jt ), and the log of GDP per capita in a country and year, log(gdppc it ) and log(gdppc jt ), as measures for market size and the quality of the economic and institutional environment. These variables are used as Internationales' geographical database as described in Mayer and Zignago (2011) .
In particular, we use log distance in kilometers between the most populated cities of two countries, denoted by log(dist ij ), as well as a variable measuring if two countries share a land common border, border ij , to account for geography as an impediment of patent trading. Moreover, we include a binary indicator variable, language ij , which is unity if two countries share a common official language and zero else. The results in Egger and Toubal (2015) suggest that language communality does not only stimulate goods trade but economic transactions at large and, hence, it might matter for patent trading as well. Finally we include a set of four binary indicator variables from that source which measure former colonial relationships between two countries. Such relationships are important, as they make trade relationships more likely. Two of those variables measure whether a colonial relationship existed in the past at all, colony ij , or even after 1945, post1945 col ij , respectively, and two other binary indicator variables capture whether two countries had the same colonizer, same col ij , or whether they are currently in a colonial relationship, current col ij .
We should add that there are differences between countries in the regulation of patenting and the inclination towards formally demanding as well as implementing the protection of innovations. Such differences may be accounted for econometrically by including fixed country effects and time-invariant error components.
Descriptive statistics
We summarize descriptive features of the dependent variables (patents filed per country and year; patents traded per country-pair and year) and their determinants, including the b-index and EAT R R&D in Table 1 . We illustrate the correlation between the b-index and the EAT R R&D as well as the correlation between the b-index and the EAT R (on physical-capital investments)
in the spirit of Griffith (1998, 2003) in Figures 1 and 2 for the most recent year we have data on the tax variables, 2012. In the covered data, the top numbers of patents filed during the period 1996-2012 came from the United States, Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. Overall about 25% of the countries in our sample filed 75% of all patents over 1996-2012. African countries had few to no patent filings at all.
When considering the change of ownership of all 2,079,738 new patents covered in the data, the ownership changed for 9.5% of them, and it changed more than once other investments. Whenever no specific R&D tax incentives exist, EM T R R&D = EM T R and EAT R R&D = EAT R.
for only 0.9%. These numbers are consistent with the evidence for the United States in Serrano (2010) . Clearly, we observe patents only in the early stage of their life cycle, namely for the first 5-6 years, on average, up until 9 months after a patent is granted. Hence, the numbers are remarkable, reflecting a high demand and supply for intellectual property in the early phase of innovations for which intellectual property protection is sought.
Throughout the observation period 1996-2012 and across all countries covered, the share of sold patents in previously held patents is highest for the Cayman Islands (30%), Cyprus (22%), and Panama (19%), and it is lowest for Cuba (0.5%), Jordan (1.3%), and Indonesia (1.8%). Hence, the ownership turnover is highest among the top-ranking countries in terms of patent filing. A similar pattern emerges when considering the share of patents acquired relative to the previously held patents. 5 Empirical framework and results
Estimation approach
For estimation, in particular, of the partial effect of R&D tax and non-tax incentives for patent filing and patent trading, we employ count data models for both the number of patents filed per country and year (and, eventually, technology field) and for the number of patents traded per country-pair and year (and, eventually, technology field). Since countries or country-pairs (by technology field) are repeatedly observed over time, we condition out fixed country effects with patent filing and random country-pair effects (eventually, by technology field) with patent trading, respectively. 23 In general, we will use the terms (gross) patent trading and patent selling interchangeably in this section.
Let us denote patent filings by inventors in country i at time t by F it and patent trade from country i to j at time t by T ijt . Moreover, denote the time-variant country determinants of patent filing and the potentially country-pair-time-variant determinants of patent trading by {X 
In Poisson, the conditional variance is assumed to be proportional to the conditional mean in the data. The negative binomial model does not make this assumption, and we use it as an alternative to Poisson in this paper. However, both model types belong in the class of exponential-family models with identical expressions for the conditional mean and, hence, both of them are consistent as they only differ by weighting (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; or Winkelmann, 2008) . We generally estimate Poisson and negative binomial models by maximum likelihood.
For covariates {X F it , X T ijt }, the parameters {β F , β T } reflect elasticities on variables in logs and semi-elasticities for fractional variables such as tax rates.
The role of combined tax and non-tax instruments for patent filing
To estimate the effect of tax incentives on the filing of patents in a given country, we aggregate up to the level of years and countries. Moreover, we condition on frontend incentives as captured by both the b-index and, alternatively and preferably, the EAT R R&D (and, implicitly, the underlying individual tax instruments such as tax rates, deductions, and super deductions) as well as tax holidays and grants and back-end incentives such as patent box regimes, simultaneously. We summarize the results of fixed country(-technology-field)-effects regressions for patent filings in Table 3. The table is With an intensive-margin innovation output of interest, Columns 2 and 5 would be preferred. If the outcome represented a mix of innovation output at the extensive and intensive margins, Columns 3 and 6 would be preferred. Then, the parameters on the EM T R R&D and EAT R R&D should be interpreted as to reflect a product of the relative importance weight of marginal and discrete, respectively, patent outcome times the marginal effect of the combined tax instruments. The exponential-family models employed suggest that the tax-incentive parameters should be interpreted as semi-elasticities: hence, a parameter of β k on such an instruments suggests that the percentage response in outcome (patent filing) is approximately 100(exp(β k ) − 1).
At the bottom of the table, we report the number of patent filings feeding into the regressions. According to Table 3 , there are 2,047,480 patent filings altogether across all countries and years. Table 3 about here −− Table 3 suggests that there is an overall positive effect of front-end incentives for R&D summarized by the EAT R R&D or the b-index. Also other front-end incentives such as tax holidays and grants in the patent-filing country tend to exert a positive effect on patent filing. Back-end incentives such as having a patent-box induce a negative effect on the filing of patents. While a greater average patent value per country and year measured by average backward citations per patent appears to be positively correlated with patent filing, the opposite is true for forward citations.
−−
Moreover, while an increase in country size appears to trigger more patent filing, the opposite is true for an increase in per-capita income. The latter effect in conjunction with the evidence on the impact of forward citations on patent filing is some indication of mean reversion: patent filing increases ceteris paribus particularly in emerging filing countries (moderately-rich countries where prospects of high future patent values were not dominant in the past). In general, the negative binomial regressions do not suggest that there is a role to play for the b-index (i.e., the effective marginal tax rate) for patent filing, while the EAT R R&D enters statistically significantly, no matter of whether we use the b-index alone instead of EAT R R&D in Column 5 or along with it in Column 6. Table 4 summarizes Poisson and negative binomial pseudo-maximum likelihood regression results (accounting for random country-pair effects) for patent trading (selling) by country i to country j in year t. 24 As with the table on patent filing, the one on patent trading has an identical horizontal and vertical structure. Countrytime-specific variables related to policy instruments, patent value, and country size as well as per-capita income enter once for the selling country (i) and once for the purchasing country (j). Table 4 about here −− Table 4 employs the selling-and purchasing-country b-indices, four other frontend policy measures (reflecting tax holidays and grants), two back-end policy measures (reflecting the use of patent boxes), and 19 control variables. Clearly, one could be more restrictive in accounting for tax-policy instruments than we are. For instance, one could exclude front-end tax incentives in destination countries from the regressions. For instance, some countries such as Germany limit the extent to which patent owners can escape the taxation of future patent-related income even after a patent transfer. However, in general equilibrium the tax environments both in origin and destination countries will play a role for patent trading, even if the impact of some of the tax instruments (e.g., front-end measures in origin countries of back-end measures in both origin and destination countries) is admittedly more direct than that of others (e.g., back-end measures in destination countries).
The role of combined tax and non-tax instruments for patent trading
−−
The regressions suggest that the volume of patent trade rises significantly with a higher EAT R R&D and/or a higher b-index in the country of origin. There is a difference in the qualitative impact of the b-index between Poisson and the (more 24 Notice that running regressions with fixed country-pair effects would leave little room for identification, since patent trading is much rarer than patent filing. Moreover, some of the covariates used in the analysis are time-invariant and would be fully collinear with the fixed pair effects. trustworthy) negative binomial regressions. The origin-and destination-country bindices even matter in the negative binomial when conditioning on the EAT R R&D s, and no significant effect of the destination-country EAT R R&D is identified for patent trading. Also other front-end policy measures matter. E.g., in Column 6 of Table 4 origin-country tax holidays as well as origin-and destination-country patent boxes appear to matter for the volume of patent trading.
Moreover, patents are primarily sold by countries where researchers are relatively abundant and to countries with a lot of owners. Furthermore, patents are primarily sold by (purchased from) countries where the patent value is high as reflected in more medium-term forward X-, I-, or Y-citations, a bigger patent scope, or more backward citations. Patents are traded more frequently between larger, less distant countries. However, patent trading is much rarer than patent filing, so that the results appear generally less robust for patent trading than they do for patent filing.
Partial quantitative effects of individual tax instruments behind effective tax rates
In this subsection, we summarize the quantitative effects of the individual tax instruments behind the b-index and the EAT R R&D by country and year. For this, we increase each underlying tax instrument (the corporate profit tax rate, the netpresent value of capital depreciation allowances, tax credit, and super deduction) by one standard deviation (1SD) at a time. We do so in order to obtain quantitative effects which are normalized by the magnitude of the variation in the data for the respective instruments. 25 The corresponding results can be found in Tables 5 and   6 .
−− Tables 5-6 about here −−
25 Doing so means that we change binary variables in a continuous fashion and that we eventually violate their upper bounds. Nevertheless, the adopted strategy is useful in order to make the individual shocks quantitatively comparable.
Using ∆b − index and the parameters {β We obtain the percentage change of a +1SD change in one component of the b-index or the EAT R R&D on patent filings in percent, ∆F it , based on In Tables 7 and 8 , we report selected moments of ∆F it (∆b − index it ) and
) associated with +1SD changes for the two years (1996 and 2012) and four tax instruments in Tables 5-6 based on the Poisson and negative binomial models, respectively. Notice that the underlying parameter estimates on the bindex and the EAT R R&D used in Table 7 are −0.171 (from Column 2 in Table 3) and −0.349 (from Column 1 in Table 3 ), respectively. The underlying parameter estimates on the b-index and the EAT R R&D used in Table 8 are −0.245 (from Column 5 in Table 3 ) and −0.552 (from Column 4 in Table 3 ), respectively. In the interest of brevity, we focus on five moments of the distribution of partial effects across all countries for each underlying instrument and the years 1996 and 2012:
the 10th percentile, the 25th percentile, the median (or 50th percentile), the 75th percentile, and the 90th percentile.
−− Tables 7 and 8 26 Recall that the associated regression parameters on the b-index are not statistically significant with the negative binomial model in Table 3 .
Partial effects of individual tax-policy instruments on aggregate patent trading
Akin to the partial effects on patent filing, we obtain the percentage change of a +1SD change in one component of the b-index or the EAT R R&D on patent acquisitions in percent, ∆T jt , based on In Tables 9 and 10 , we report ∆T jt (∆b−index jt ) and ∆T jt (∆EAT R
R&D jt
) associated with +1SD changes for the two years (1996 and 2012) and four tax instruments in Tables 5-6 , similar to patent filing above. The underlying parameter estimates on the b-index and the EAT R R&D used in the table are −0.609 (Column 2 in Table   4 ) and −0.577 (Column 1 in Table 4 ) for Poisson in Table 9 , respectively. The corresponding numbers are 0.554 (Column 5 in Table 4 ) and 0.517 (Column 4 in Table 4 ), respectively, with the negative binomial model. Akin to Table 7, Table   10 summarizes five moments of the distribution of partial effects across all countries for each underlying instrument and the years 1996 and 2012.
−− Tables 9 and 10 about here −−
Since the negative binomial model is preferable and the acquisition-country EAT R R&D is not statistically significant in Table 4 , we focus on the discussion of the results for the b-index in Table 10 . Again, we concentrate on the median country in 1996 versus 2012 and note that there is a large degree of dispersion across countries in every year. The results suggest that, in absolute terms, acquisition-country super-deductions were the relatively most important tax instrument for marginal patent acquisitions by the median country in 1996 followed by tax credits, while this ranking was reversed in 2012.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was an in-depth assessment of the extent and nature of policy incentives for marginal and average R&D projects across countries and time. In pursuit of this goal, the paper established the hitherto most extensive and detailed database on front-end as well as back-end R&D tax incentives. Beyond establishing this rich data-set, the paper provided an analysis of responses of the filing and the trading of patents across countries and time.
This analysis of patenting revealed an important difference in the importance of effective marginal (such as the b-index) versus effective average tax rates associated with returns on R&D investments. The results suggested that in particular patent filing mainly responds to effective average rather than effective marginal R&D tax incentives, which suggests that associated decisions are relatively discrete. When ignoring this issue, the relative importance of low statutory tax rates and net-present discounted values of R&D investment deductions is understated relative to the one of other front-end measures such as tax credit, tax deductions, grants, or tax holidays and also relative to the one of back-end incentives such as patent boxes. These insights are of apparent relevance for policy makers. It will be interesting for future work to allude to the role of proper measures for extensive R&D investment incentives for other extensive investment margins such as the location of specific types of operations within firms and of firms altogether. Notes patent filing variables: There are 49 countries of origin, and 16 years, leading to 639 observations. X and I citations refer to documents that are particularly important when taken alone. Y citations refer to documents that are particularly relevant if considered in combination documents of the same category. According to Squicciarini et al. (2013) these citations restrict the patentability if made in a patent application. SD is short for standard deviation. Notes patent trading variables: There are 50 countries of origin (invention or sales), 52 countries of destination (ownership or acquisition), and 16 years, leading to 9425 observations. X and I citations refer to documents that are particularly important when taken alone. Y citations refer to documents that are particularly relevant if considered in combination documents of the same category. According to Squicciarini et al. (2013) these citations restrict the patentability if made in a patent application. SD is short for standard deviation. We cover a total of 106 countries in our data. We cover a total of 106 countries in our data. Notes: Dependent variable: Annual patent count of patents filed by country-technology field for years 1996-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using two-tailed z-statistics. Notes: Dependent variable: annual count of the total number of patents, changing the owner, by country-technology field for years 1996-2012. All regressions include fixed time effects. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using two-tailed z-statistics. The standard deviations (SD) used in the calculation are the following: tax rate τ : 0.0784, net-present value of depreciation allowances (N P V ) for buildings and machinery: a)machinery: 0.1514, b)buildings: 0.1829, taxcredit for R&D: 0.0795, superdeduction: 0.3021. For the increase in the tax credit a non-incremental, non taxable tax credit for current expenditure is assumed. When a level tax credit is in place, we take the tax credit scheme as given and increase the tax credit. The table reflects an increase in one of the four components of the b-index at a time for the years 1996 and 2012 for 58 countries. The standard deviations (SD) used in the calculation are the following: tax rate τ : 0.0784, net-present value of depreciation allowances (N P V ) for buildings and machinery: a)machinery: 0.1514, b)buildings: 0.1829, taxcredit for R&D: 0.0795, superdeduction: 0.3021. For the increase in the tax credit a non-incremental, non taxable tax credit for current expenditure is assumed. When a level tax credit is in place, we take the tax credit scheme as given and increase the tax credit. 
